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Vice, Virtue, and Memory:
The Question of Fairness at Nuremberg
Kiegan E. Lloyd
INTRODUCTION
At the end of World War II more than
thirty-five million people—mostly civilians
—were killed by the Allied and Axis powers.
Therefore, the Nazi regime exterminated six
million Jews in their concentration camps
alone, and someone had to be held accountable. 1 Nazi leaders were prosecuted in the
Nuremberg trials, beginning with the 1945
trial before the International Military Tribunal. The 1945 trial not only initiated a
series of other trials, but it also held accountable twenty-two major figures of the
Third Reich, charging them with four main
indictments: crimes against the peace, war
crimes, crimes against humanity and conspiracy to commit any of these crimes.2
The Palace of Justice in Nuremberg is
remembered today as an institution that
brought to justice those who committed or
oversaw unforgivable crimes. However, I
argue that the trials were biased for three
reasons. First, the prosecution, headed by
Robert Jackson from the United States of
America, had considerably more latitude
with the bench in preparing witnesses, crossexaminations, and preparing arguments compared to the defendants’ counsel(s). Second,
the defence lacked adequate time and
facilities to prepare and present a reasonable
defence and were not afforded fair due
process. Finally, the unpreparedness of the
defence counsel, the spoliation of evidence
by the prosecution and the impartiality of the
tribunal judges all contributed to making the
trial biased.
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BACKGROUND
The International Military Tribunal was
established under the London Charter which
was an agreement by the major ally nations.3
Some critics condemned the use of judicial
procedures to determine guilt and impose
punishment of the war criminals, urging that
to do so would be to turn a court into a
political instrument by which the victors
exercised their power to punish the defeated.
As an example, Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone
from the United States of America privately
labeled the trial as a “high grade lynching
party.” 4 However, Levy and Sznaider point
out that the symbolism of good and evil to
many individuals during the aftermath of the
Holocaust and especially during the Nuremberg trials represented to them remembrance
and memory for those that perished in the
war.5 Therefore, the outcome of the Nuremberg trials represented either the triumph of
good, or evil.
THE UNPREPAREDNESS
DEFENCE COUNSEL
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The twenty-two defendants at Nuremberg
were given a thirty-day period to prepare
their defense before the trial began. The
German lawyers assigned as defence counsel
were acquainted with German legal procedure, not the Anglo-American trial procedures that were used throughout the
Nuremberg Trials. The defence counsel had
to quickly familiarise themselves with the
Anglo-American accusatory model. 6 With
only thirty days the counsel would have been
primarily focused on looking through evidence and building their case with little time
to get accustomed to trial procedure. This
disadvantaged the defence counsel during the
trial. They were often criticized by their legal
counterparts and media for being “clumsy
and unimaginative.”7
The prosecution had an enormous
quantity of German documentation to use as
evidence in the trial. A group of military
personnel established by the Allies were
tasked with seizing and preserving all material German documents, records, and
archives in preparation for the trial. By
November 1945, the prosecution had over
17,000 pages of oral evidence, and over
22,000 pages of written evidence. The
prosecution subsequently submitted approximately 12,000–15,000 pages to the Tribunal. 8 One of the biggest deprivations of
due process rights was the defendants' lack of
access to evidence held by the prosecution
prior to the trial. This is a direct denial of the
right to adequate facilities to prepare a
defence. The prosecution had thoroughly
searched the German archives and had seized
all evidence relevant to their case. The
remaining documents (of which there were
few) were left for the defence to use. Even
some of the most crucial and possibly exonerating material was not made available to
the defence. 9 Occupying authorities barred
the access of defence counsel to document
archives, and they were unable to make the
investigations necessary to form their deFall 2021, Vol. 13, Issue 2
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fences. Even while the trial was in progress,
access to material documentation remained
difficult for the defence because often their
requests were delayed.10
SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE
PROSECUTION
The lack of access to documents was
often because of the deliberate withholding
of evidence by the prosecution. Initially,
Justice Jackson indicated the willingness of
the prosecution to make evidence available to
the defence. When the Tribunal directed
Jackson to provide the defense with all the
evidence, he was reluctant to do so. Before
the defence could access any documentary
evidence, the prosecution ordered that the
defense counsel must first state what they
were looking for and then make a specific
request. No indexes or summaries were
provided; therefore, without knowing what
the documents contained, defence counsel
was unable to make any sort of specific
request. When defence counsel did request
copies of documents from the prosecution,
they had often “disappeared,” or were made
available in insufficient quantities, incomplete, not translated and days too late.11
During the trial, Justice Jackson suggested
that the defence should not be permitted to
read its documents into the records, and
instead should be limited to submitting the
document books to the Judges. Dr. Dix the
counsel for Hjalmar Schacht addressed the
Court in response:
I cannot consider it just and I cannot
consider it fair if the prosecution had the
right, for months, not only once but
sometimes repeatedly and often, to bring
their evidence to the knowledge of the
public…The defence counsel must and
would consider it a severe and intolerable
limitation of the defence, if, contrary to
the procedure exercised so far by the
prosecution, it were deprived of the
possibility of presenting, in its turn, at
2
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least the relevant parts of its own
documentary evidence to the Tribunal
verbally and with comments.12
As a result of the evidential rules, the
Tribunal accepted ex parte witness affidavits
from the prosecution, though they deprived
the defendants the right of crossexamination. 13 Another issue faced by the
defence was that they faced language and
translation difficulties, which exacerbated the
time pressures in preparing the case. When
the defence requested copies of documentation from the prosecution, they were often
provided only in English. Once the documents were eventually translated, errors in
the translations were found.14
IMPARTIALITY OF THE TRIBUNAL
JUDGES
The equality of the trial regarding the
legal procedure can also be questioned. As
previously mentioned, the trial ran according
to Anglo-American legal proceedings a
method unfamiliar to the defendants and their
counsel. This left the defence at a distinct
disadvantage compared to the prosecution.
There was no equality between the
prosecution and the defence regarding the
trial procedure adopted. In fact, the reliance
on documentary evidence disadvantaged the
defence because of the sheer quantity of
documents the prosecution submitted as
evidence. There was no real equality of
manpower between the parties. 15 A major
obstacle for the defense and impacting a fair
trial was the one-sidedness of the charges.
The Nuremberg Trial is widely criticized for
not allowing the tu quoque defence, which
meant that the Allies could not be charged
with the offences they were charging the
defendants with, despite having committed
them. To prevent Allied acts being called into
question, the prosecution-based charges
solely on German documentation. The defendants were prohibited from presenting evidence that implicated the Allies in any war
Fall 2021, Vol. 13, Issue 2
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crimes, crimes against humanity or crimes
against the peace. 16 Furthermore, the
Tribunal at Nuremberg was not an
independent body because there was a
substantial overlap between lawmaker, prosecutor, and judge. Not only were there
overlaps in the administration of justice at
Nuremberg, the law makers, prosecutors and
Tribunal Judges were all from the victorious
Allied nations. The defence had strong
objections against this:
[T]he defense consider it their duty to
point out at this juncture another
peculiarity of this Trial which departs
from the commonly recognised principles
of modern jurisprudence. This one party
to the proceedings is all in one: creator of
the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules
of law, prosecutor and judge.17
The impartiality of the Nuremberg Tribunal
can be questioned regarding the four judges
on the Bench and their prejudice.
At the opening session of the trial, the
four Judges professed, “I solemnly declare
that I will exercise all my powers and duties
as a member of the International Military
Tribunal honourably, impartially, and conscientiously” 18 While great efforts were
made to honour this declaration, and such
efforts were often successful, the impartiality
of the Tribunal remains a contentious
element of the trial. The victorious nations of
the War sat on the Tribunal to judge the
defeated. United States Senator Robert Taft
declared, “The trial of the vanquished by the
victors cannot be impartial.” 19 The Allies
suffered tremendous losses during the war at
the hands of the Germans. The argument is
that the victors would not be well equipped to
judge the German war leaders because they
would not be free from “hatred, passion and
national prejudice.” 20 As citizens of the
victorious nations, the Judges occasionally
interacted with members of the prosecution.
For example, during the trial, Soviet prosecutor Andrei Vyshinsky came to Nurem3
3
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berg to work with the prosecution. While he
was visiting, a party was held in his honour,
which the prosecution and Tribunal Judges
all attended. Therefore, these types of interaction would have made impartiality difficult
to maintain.21
CONCLUSION
Each of these the discussions of
unpreparedness of the defence counsel, the
equality between the prosecution and defense, the impartiality of the tribunal jud-ges
and the spoliation of evidence by the
prosecution all contributed to the heavy
burden placed on the defense counsel(s)
shoulders and as result these burdens im-

pacted the defense to present a reasonable
defence. And ultimately, they were not
afforded fair due process; as Hermann
Wilhelm Göring puts it: “Der Sieger wird
immer der Richter und der Besiegte stets der
Angeklagte sein.”22 Someone had to be held
accountable for the actions of World War II.
The overwhelming evidence against the
accused, the emotional impact of the Holocaust and the societal and media pressures to
assign blame meant that due process was
sacrificed. The legal history of the
Nuremberg Trials illustrates the complexities of determining guilt or innocence
and assigning accountability in the context of
large-scale atrocities.
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